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Abstract 
 The representative democracy has become weak and fragmented, and 
under control of international market policy approaches of national state 
governments and multilateral agreement organizations like the European 
Union. In this paper, I argue that any study and explanation of economic crises 
and their contemporary supranational governance structures solutions 
conducted in the democratic capitalism countries as USA during the last fifty 
years, must be anchored in a multidisciplinary context. Crises of the art are 
rooted in social structures and classes, and in the behavior of the capitalistic 
system, based on inequality and new classical economic theory and right-wing 
political ideology. 
 
Keywords: Financial crisis. Recession, Western capitalism, European 
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Introduction 
 The political German scientist Wolfgang Streeck writes in the Le 
Monde Diplomatique, January 2012 that “Every day we read in the 
newspapers that the markets dictate what sovereign and democratic states can 
do and what they cannot do for their citizens. The consequence is that the 
citizens not any longer look upon their government as their representatives but 
as representatives for interest of foreign states and international 
organizations.” This is a correct statement. However, one term should be 
substituted with another one. It is not the market that directly dictates 
governments – that is what deregulation of markets does. There is a close 
relation between the development of the modern western regulatory state and 
the process of creating markets and correcting markets in terms of 
Giandomenico Majone’s conceptualization of the regulatory state (Majone, 
1994;1997; 2003). It is regulations to accomplish these goals – both nationally 
and internationally – which dictate governments. The European Union dictates 




the government of the member states. So does membership of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO); national impotence is the outcome of the huge amount 
of worldwide market agreements. 
 Financial crisis and recession dominate the Western capitalism of our 
time. The crisis in the Euro-zone is evidently a grave blow to European 
integration, but is intimately connected to the international financial crisis. The 
collapse of the national state finances may be understood as a manifestation 
of a fundamental mechanism in the capitalistic system, where un-balance and 
un-stability are the rule instead of the opposite. After the Second World War, 
western democratic capitalism went through three successive and conflicting 
phases, and is now going through a forth one.  
 In Europe, where the financial crisis transformed into sovereign debt 
crises in several countries, the current phase of the denial cycle is marked by 
an official policy approach predicated on the assumption that normal growth 
can be restored through a mix of austerity, privatization and less state 
involvement (anti-Keynes). The claim is that advanced countries do not need 
to apply the standard toolkit used by emerging markets, including debt 
restructurings, higher inflation, capital controls, and significant financial 
repression. Advanced countries do not resort to such gimmicks, policymakers 
say. To do so would be to give up hard-earned credibility, thereby 
destabilizing expectations and throwing the economy into a future vicious 
circle. Although the view that advanced country financial crises are 
completely different – and therefore should be handled completely differently 
– has been a recurrent ideological refrain (notably in the European sovereign 
debt crises and the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis), this view is at odds with 
the historical track record. In most advanced economies, based on 
Keynesianism, state intervention, debt restructuring or conversions, financial 
tools, and higher inflation have been integral parts of the resolution of 
significant debt overhangs. 
 The post-war period of economic crises started with phase one – the 
stagflation crisis of the 1970s. Afterwards came phase two – a public deficit 
crisis, followed by phase three – a privatized deficit crisis. Today, the forth 
phase is at work, consisting of both a public and a privatized deficit crisis – a 
combination crisis. Adequately, three solutions to crises has been tested out 
with conditional success, and a forth solution is by now implemented. What 
we know is that every one of the solutions for the crises using traditional tools 
has led up to a yet another crisis. 
 
The Stagflation crisis 
 The so called stagflation crisis emerged in the 1970s. Globalization, 
deindustrialization, and lowered economic growth generated both 
unemployment and inflation as parallel processes, thereof the term Stagflation 
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(stagnation and inflation) crisis. According to Keynesian interventionist 
economic theory two such parallel processes should not happen. The 
democratic capitalism was in a deep crisis, followed by strikes and riots from 
students and the working class. The Governments sought their solution by 
leaning their shoulders to an expanding monetary economy. To regain peace 
between labor and capital the government at the time left the Keynesian 
welfare state policy in order to secure money for investments in industries and 
workplaces. However, at the same time the welfare state was expanded and 
social security schemes were erected, and salaries for the workers were 
increased. In the beginning, the inflation was not a real problem for the 
working class. The working class was organized in strong trade unions, which 
were able to assure salaries were adjusted according to the inflation. Inflation 
bothers and threatens first and foremost creditors and people owning bank 
accounts, and not owners of real estate and those involved with speculation of 
capital. The working class is normally not a part of the two latter. Streeck 
(2012) writes that there are reasons to believe that the inflation at the time may 
be looked upon as a monetary political reflex of a conflict of allocation 
between a labor force who claim access to work and a greater share of the 
national income, and a speculative class of capitalists whose intention was to 
maximize the profit of the capital. In this context inflation means an economic 
situation out of control; the working class claims welfare state rights while the 
capitalists stress the rules of the market and the holy right of private self-
governance. 
 The stagflation crisis hit the relation and balance between labor and 
capital, and thereof the traditional democratic principles. A democratic deficit 
was the result, and led to politics of fighting the inflation by national and 
international regulation. The politics became subordinated judicial decision-
making (Europautredningen 2012). As a general phenomenon in the 
regulatory state, the term democratic deficit indicates that elected and 
representative assemblies at different levels have become politically 
weakened, while technocratic implementing authorities of regulations have 
strengthened their power because they have been given independent self-
regulatory power by law. The law might be national public law, international 
law or private corporation statutes (Veggeland 2010, 2012). 
 This represents – as already mentioned – a dilemma, as far as it 
concerns the democratic order. Laws, agreements and regulations start 
dictating national policies; governance replaces government. The citizens 
don’t look upon their governments as their own representatives but as 
representatives for other independent powers outside their domain. The 
weakening of the representatives creates a deficit of parliamentary democracy, 
it means a deficit of ‘government by the people’, causing the upcoming of 
‘governance for the people (Scharpf 1999). Steering and service producing 




groups of regulators, arm’s length bodies, networking groups, partnerships, 
provide governance for the people, and replace representative political 
government and ordinary public administration. Michael Keating (1998:39) 
expresses the situation this way: ‘governance is what exists when government 
is weak and fragmented.’ 
 The new democracy that occurred after the stagflation crisis is split 
into two institutional principles, i.e. first what is called an input government 
democratic order, and second, an output governance democratic order like the 
US and the EU. The input democratic order gets its legitimacy from its 
parliamentary chain, while the output democratic order gets its legitimacy 
from its ability to accomplish efficiency and results related to set-ups of 
political goals. ‘In the regulatory state, policies gain their legitimacy first and 
foremost from achievements, efficiency, and effectiveness, that is, from the 
output or outcome of agencies and executives’ (Lane and Ersson, 2003: 183). 
 Let us go back and look closer upon the Keynesian principles, 
including the principles of an active interventionist state which was 
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Figure 1: The Phillips-curve: The original curve shows the empirical relation between 
inflation and unemployment. The thin arrow indicates a development coming up in 1970s 
and 1980s with both increasing inflation and unemployment through the years. The thick 
arrow indicates the present low inflation but growing unemployment through the 1990s and 
2000s.  
 
 The characteristics of the Phillips-curve were drawn by the economist 
W. Phillips in 1958, based on empirical evidence. Marked 1) in fig. 1 the 
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original curve is presented showing the relation between inflation and 
unemployment in national economies in the 1950s. In the Keynesian welfare 
state, it was the responsibility of the state to secure balance at a low level for 
both inflation and unemployment. With increasing inflation, the state was 
organized to reduce the effective demand and thereby increase the 
unemployment, and the other way around with increasing unemployment – the 
state should intervene financially and stimulate the effective demand. In the 
1950s and 1960s this mechanism functioned with stable inflation and 
unemployment at a low level. 
 In the 1970s the Keynesian mechanisms finished working as they used 
to do; as fig. 1 illustrates, the curve started moving upwards. The national 
economies in the OECD-countries stabilized on higher levels both regarding 
inflation and unemployment (OECD 1997), see fig. 1. The inflation crisis had 
emerged. 
 The leading economists were quite confused and the OECD hesitated 
regarding counteracting advices to their member states. In the 1980s came the 
advice at last – priority should be given to fighting the inflation growth. Low 
inflation should again be reestablished with the consequence of increasing 
unemployment. This decision was in accordance with the wave of theories 
introduced by the Nobel Prize Winner Milton Friedman (1962/1972: 39), 
which stressed monetary principles, i.e. regulatory politics controlling the 
amount of money circulating in the economy, and the establishment of an 
objective for inflation stabilization at a low level. Friedman writes: “There is 
a widespread recognition that control over money can be a potent tool for 
controlling and shaping the economy” (1972:16). This power to control and to 
manage the economy he excluded from the governments and transferred to the 
financial institutions. In the wake of his theory, the national central banks 
became organized as arm’s length bodies, with the disappearing of political 
instruction authority. The central banks were given the authority to manage 
the monetary politics, such as to decide the level of the interest rate and to 
control the currency value in relation to other countries’ currency values. 
 The term used to characterize the ruling monetary politics was supply-
side economy. This politics was based ideologically on liberalization ideas 
regarding credit policies. Fig. 1 marks the development by the thick arrow 
indicating low inflation rate but growing unemployment as a consequence. 
The politics represented a temporary solution to the stagflation crisis, but at 
the same time, little by little, created the conditions for a new crisis 
development – the public credit crisis described below. Monetary economic 
policy established the new regulatory state (Veggeland 2010), together with 
globalization processes and the development of transnational networks 
constituted problems, which needed regulation to be temporarily solved. The 
removal of political instruction authority in the wake of New Public 




Management (NPM) theories and practice (Lane and Ersson 2003) generated 
in its prolonging of governance the democratic deficit. Monetary regulation – 
and regulation in general – worked fine from its onset, achieving goals of 
liberalism and thereby legitimacy, i.e. output legitimacy. The output 
legitimacy challenged the traditional principles of parliamentary democracy, 
i.e. the input representative democracy.  
 The new democracy of the regulatory state and the democratic 
capitalism inhere both dependent and independent variables (Dahl, 1989). The 
input democratic side, together with the regulatory function of the constitution, 
represent the parliamentary democracy. However, the input elements of 
steering depend intimately on how the regulatory authorities are organized on 
the output side of the democracy. Michael Keating (1998) suggests that 
regulatory regimes are what expand when the input democracy is weak and 
fragmented. He indicates that regulatory regimes threaten the traditional 
democratic order. The statement is not obviously true. It might be that what 
concerns him is the balance between work and capital. The weakening of the 
trade unions as part of the input democratic order means that the market and 
the capital gain output democratic power. That is what happened in the wake 
of the stagflation crisis. The regulatory state penetrated the representative 
democratic order leaving it weak, and the citizens in a state of political 
exclusion. 
 The European Union had to fundamentally continue to be rooted in a 
democratic order based on outcome legitimacy because of the Union’s 
transnational character as a con-federal organization inhering supranational 
federal elements. This reality influences the member countries of the whole 
European Economic Area (EEA) (Europautredningen 2012) regarding 
steering ability. Joseph H. Weiler, among others, points out in his book The 
Constitution of Europe, that a paradox occurs in this context. The EU’s way 
of governance inheres a form of "dualism," concerning the representative and 
the outcome-based democratic order, he writes. According to Weiler this will 
also, in the long run, become the case because the EU suffers from a ‘demos 
problem,’ i.e. a loss of a coherent people, which means alien citizens 
neglecting the input democratic order and causing a weak parliamentary 
steering chain. The EU consists of numerous peoples with different languages, 
identities and cultures, with the non-existence of a single European identity. 
This indicates that a united input democratic federal Europe is unlikely to 
come into existence. The dualism has a structural explanation, supported by 
other conditional elements. Globalization and transnational networks 
connected to regulatory agreements maintain the dualism of the regulatory 
state (Scharpf 1999, Veggeland 2009).  It started with the stagflation crisis in 
Europe, which generated ever more supranational power since the 1980s.  
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 The national markets for investments and consuming were too limited, 
and the integration of markets in Europe went on with the introduction of the 
internal market between 1988 – 1992. New digital technology influenced the 
market integration. This technology created branches of growth and the raise 
of prices on both labor and capital. On the other hand, traditional branches 
stagnated. The outcome was stagnation and inflation as parallel processes, 
therefore – "stagflation" (Cumes, 1984). This happened in contrast to 
Keynesian theory which recommended an active and intervening state. 
According to this theory the state was obliged to intervene financially in the 
market in order to achieve political objectives. When unemployment 
increased, the state should have increased its investments in job creating 
activities, and the opposite when raising inflation. As fig. 1 indicates, the 
Keynesian theoretical tools did not work out effectively any longer. It became 
important to find a new path out of the crisis. Fighting inflation became the 
keyword for a solution. To achieve this goal of lowering the inflation, another 
goal came up, namely to eliminate the power of the national trade unions to 
make them ineffective in their struggle and claim for higher salaries. 
 New markets had to be created. A strategy was to market-orientate the 
public sector to make this sector contribute to the growth of the aggregating 
national income. Arm’s length bodies organized in accordance with private 
sector’s bodies, and steering by objectives became the ruling governance 
principle. The new regulatory state came into being, legitimized by the 
ideology of the new liberalism which claimed the economic perfection of 
market competition, steering by objections and open up new markets by the 
establishment of free trade zones and international agreements. Latest, the 
negotiation between the EU and USA goes on with the objective of 
establishing a huge free trade zone, TTIP between the two continents,  
 
The public crisis of credit 
 Following the stagflation crisis, the adoption of extensive state loans 
happened in Western welfare states to compensate for inflation and stagnation, 
i.e. to get the inflation under control at a stable low level. However, the reasons 
for the fast growing public deficit were others, too. Stagnation and high 
unemployment made both rich and poor people skeptical towards tax payment, 
and new liberal politics for tax cuts got introduced in many Western countries, 
especially in Angle-Saxon countries like the USA and the UK. Either way, 
automatically, without inflation it became impossible to increase the taxes, 
simply because the salaries stagnated and often decreased, and this caused 
shrinking access for the state to tax revenues. The low economic growth also 
terminated the depreciation of public deficit along with the sinking of national 
currency values. This depreciation had been a supplement to economic growth 




because the inflation reduced the value of the credit deficit. Public loans were 
also necessary to maintain the services of the welfare state. 
 The inflation got under control in the late 1980s, though the 
unemployment rate stayed high in most Western countries. The high 
unemployment threatened the peace established in the labor market in the 
Western democratic countries, and thereof political support to the ruling 
political parties was undermined. Right wing parties/groups succeeded in their 
agitation for free market solutions. To increase the public deficit seemed to be 
the appropriate alternative solution to both the economic and political 
development problems. In short, the public loans arose heavily in countries 
like the USA and many of the EU member states. But similar to the inflation 
problem the national states can’t increase their budget deficit indefinitely.  
 The economists pointed out the fact that financing public and private 
consuming by loan removed means for investment in the private sector. It 
would create an upheaval of the interest rate, and thereof a declining growth 
in that sector. The temporary solution to this negative situation and the first 
public economic deficit crisis, in accordance with ruling neoliberal ideology, 
was to liberalize the corporate financial sector. This approach started with 
organizational liberalization of Central Banks in many countries during the 
1980s. An upheaval for lending money to people came into being, and minimal 
claims adhered to guarantee and security for loans to both private and public 
lenders were introduced. Stable low interest rate tempted the citizens to raise 
loans for both private consume and investments of high risk. 
 
The privatized crisis of credit 
 Of course, the liberalization initiative did not mean that the 
governments had found an ultimate solution to the public credit crisis. 
However, the liberalized loan market generated new possibilities, namely 
access for most people to take advantage of the financial capital that was 
offered to them. Low interest rate decided by the central bank became a tool 
for keeping the level of consume high. Subprime loan taken up for consume 
became a substitute for a situation of stagnated welfare state policies. Banks 
and individuals believed in an enduring price upheaval in the real estate 
market. The value of a real estate unit was estimated to the price of X, and 
loan was taken up according to that price with no other guarantee than the real 
estate itself. It was suggested that the next year the real estate could be sold 
for a price of X +Y, and from that transaction both the bank and individual 
loan taker was secured from loss of their invested money. Streeck calls this 
type of transaction thinking ‘privatized Keynesianism’ (Le Monde 
Diplomatique, January 2012), i.e. investment financed by loan in the private 
sector. Bubbles were created and later on burst. That was the situation in the 
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USA in 2008 when the financial crisis became a reality. US economy became 
better off by 2015 in terms growth, but social inequality is increasing.  
 The economist Raghuram G. Rajan emphasizes the cultural aspect of 
the financial crisis, and figures out what he call ‘Fault Lines’ (2010). He points 
out powerlessness and the absence of coherence in the US democratic 
capitalism. In particular, in his explanation he emphasizes the catastrophic 
development of economic and social inequality occurring as a crisis in many 
Western countries, and with the USA as a leading nation in that sense. I have 
mentioned the risky behavior of the banks and heavy private loan taking 
leading to the financial crisis, and Rajan connects this development to the 
situation in the USA. This behavior, he looks upon as only the last step in the 
process we have described: a process with a wrong course through political 
powerlessness in an environment of globalized and an increasingly 
uncoordinated world. 
 Justice as a cultural matter, and the fact that the citizens believe the 
government as the guarantee for democracy, is neglected. Rajan points out that 
for every single dollar in salary growth between 1976 and 2007 58 percent of 
that growth went to the 1 percent constituting the richest families in USA. He 
continues to tell us that the income of the social middleclass and the poor labor 
class has stagnated or decreased, while the income of the richest 10 percent 
increased enormously. This development created a sort of disorder neglected 
by the politicians, but obviously disturbed the legitimacy of the politics. Rajan 
shows that this dilemma got politicians to compensate for the occurrence of 
inequality and the threat to their legitimacy, by voting forward liberalization 
of the credit market and favoring consume financed by loan. He writes that 
politicians – always sensible to their electorate – are choosing what they think 
as a solution of universal impact, namely to secure cheap loans to people 
which were suffering for not having got their share in the growth of the 
economy and its outcome. The banks took advantage of the situation to earn 
money of suspect real estate loans, namely subprime loans. The real estate 
market was for a while a hot spot in its function, realizing products to 
constantly higher prices. People bought housing products characterized by 
steadily rising prices, believing that the prices would continue to rise – into 
heaven. High risk was taken in this unregulated financial game. When the US 
Federal Reserve Bank let the interest on loan rise a bit, more and more people 
were not able to upkeep their loans, i.e. pay part payments and interest rates. 
Accordingly, the banks were shaken and threatened by imminent bankruptcy 
and some indeed went bankrupt. The financial crisis spread worldwide after 
2007/2008.  
 The crisis that concerns the USA, EU and other Western countries is 
today what we might call a combination crisis, linked to both public and 
privatized loan and national budget deficits, for example, in Greek, Spain and 




Portugal. To get through this crisis the governments of these countries insist 
on budget cuts and saving programs, and cuts in salaries and pension 
arrangements. The impact of these actions is reduced market demand which 
boosts the crisis in terms of rising unemployment. A natural consequence of 
this is social and political disturbance visible in many European countries. 
Wolfgang Streeck (2012) writes: "The crisis of today threatens the democratic 
order as much as the economic order, maybe even more." As in the past, the 
crisis will find a provisional solution. Most likely the combination crisis this 
time will not favor the interests of speculative financial actors, which probably 
will become under control of stronger international regulations. The interests 
will remain, but expand themselves in tight contact with the real capital, i.e. in 
contact with global industrial monopoly interests. Consequently, the citizens 
will, to an even lower extent, look upon their government and politicians as 
representatives and guarantee for democracy. 
 
The democratic capitalism and the neo-Keynesian explanation of the 
combination crisis 
 Governmental investments – and financial decision-making to regulate 
the effective demand in national economies is based on the basic principles 
introduced by John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money. An explanation of the temporary crisis of the democratic 
capitalism linked to the Keynesian tradition must contain the following 
factors: 
 First, a central point in Keynesian theory was the argument for an 
active state whose main role was correcting markets and stabilizing economic 
circulations. I have described and analyzed the stagflation crisis of the 
1970s/80s and found that the state had remained active. The Western 
governments chose comprehensive public loan-taking and the issuing of 
government bonds, which later led to a public credit crisis. 
 Second, by using the term "inclination" to consume, Keynes was able 
to explain how the consuming behavior changed its character parallel to 
changing prices in the market – in our case in the housing market. When the 
pricing of real estate rises, an inclination rises, which generates a feeling of 
value gain, which turns into a sense of saving money. Further on, this turns 
into increasing consuming because it is believed that the "savings" are 
available right there. This is the background for the development of what we 
have called the privatized credit crisis as a follower of the public credit crisis. 
The Government liberalized the financial markets, and the inclination to 
finance consume by loans increased. The inclination was mostly created and 
inspired by the rising prices in the housing market, and the false feeling of 
thereby saving money. When the housing bubble cracked, it became clear that 
the saving was not real. 
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 Third, Keynes argued that financial melting down and the crack of 
aggregated demand in the economy was closely related to upcoming inequality 
of income and stagnation in salary payments. The government compensated 
by liberalization of the financial policy and expanded its loan reserves in order 
to keep the welfare state going by redressing social problems with 
arrangements of support, guarantees and access to privatized loans. What we 
call the combination crisis may be explained by this kind of Keynesian 
argumentation. While the net salary of 90 percent of the population changed 
very little during the last 20 years, the housing prices have grown enormously 
in the same period. It is this reality that Rajan’s ‘Fault Lines’ describes and 
analyzes. It is all about this. Selling real estate gave a surplus which generated 
an inclination to higher consume in this market. Public and privatized crises 
of credit became combined; public loan taking to pay welfare was followed by 
a privatized crisis of credit. The EURO zone of the European Union (EU) was 
hit by a crisis as a follower of the financial crisis. The EU, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) chose a 
strategy to press national governments to cut welfare arrangements to prevent 
states from going bankrupt; examples include countries like Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, Hungary and others. The privatized inclination to loan-taking 
was stopped by claiming a higher level of guarantee to get such loans. 
Figure 2. Correlation between three variables: decreasing loan taking and decreasing 
consuming implies increasing unemployment. 
 
 Fig. 2 intends to describe the situation characterizing the Western 
democratic capitalism of today, involving three variables. High level of loan-
taking and aggregated consume generated a situation of low employment. 




During the combination crisis of public and privatized credit, the 
unemployment rate will increase as time pass on. By necessity, the inclination 
to public and private consuming will be shrinking due to mutual dependency 
between the variables. The inclination to the crack-down of aggregated 
demand and the growth of unemployment is strengthening by firm budget 
regulations and pay back of public loans. This is the situation that occurred in 
the Euro-zone countries and hit them both economically and politically. In 
terms of Keynesian theory, the effective demand will decrease in the national 
economies. This triggers a negative economic spiral with growing 
unemployment followed by a corresponding decrease in purchasing power. 
When the GNP begins decreasing it triggers printing of money, and the 
economy gets threatened by increasing inflation. In the EU the European 
Central Bank (ECB) is very much aware of this mechanism, and keeps on 
implementing a strong monetary policy in the Euro-zone. The other side of the 
coin is the grave impact of this policy on the Mediterranean countries already 
hit by the crisis of the capitalism. In the Euro-zone no member state is allowed 
to devaluate its currency (Euro) in their endeavor to win more competitive 
ability in the world market. Low inflation rate keeps loans from falling in 
terms of nominal value. Consequently, the unemployment rate continues to 
rise, fig. 2, followed by social and political disorder in the European countries 
mentioned. The crisis is most likely spreading to other countries as well. 
 A temporary respond in Europe according to fig. 2 seems to be, on the 
one hand, to increase the effective demand by importing capital from outside 
Europe to compensate for internal public loan-taking.  Such capital could 
come from the growing economies of the so-called BRICS countries, i.e. 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. USA experiences a solution to 
the financial crisis by being a market for Chinese export whose payment 
remains as loan but with US dollar as involved currency in the business 
transactions. US dollars are printed and put into the money circulation, but 
inflation fails to appear because of US dollar being a global currency in 
economic transactions. 
 On the employment side, decreasing consuming might be avoided by 
increase the salaries of the labor force.. Increasing demand and consume will 
be an immediate output of the strategy – deduced from the Keynesian analyses 
of inclination. The understanding of the combination crisis in the democratic 
capitalism is detained with a failure when it is explained as a crisis caused by 
an expensive welfare state together with public loans taken up to restore and 
pay for the services of the welfare state. Also, the consideration of making the 
financial crisis part of the general housing policy and the political wish to 
make people owners of their own housing facilities is detained with failure 
(Mullard, 2011: 219). The explanation is rather to be found in the absence of 
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Keynesian theory and its recommendation of governmental interventions 
when crisis hit the economic circulation in the capitalistic economy. 
 
Conclusion: Who governs? 
 Shaping economic politics represents political choices. To go for a 
liberalized market economy, generates consequences very much different 
compared to those generated by Keynesian strategies. The Nobel Prize winner 
in economy, Paul Krugman, has named the period between 1950 and 1972 
“the period of compression” (2007). The Keynesian principles dominated and 
pressed the market and the state together in a cooperative order. The 
unemployment was low and the inflation under control. Interventions of the 
government adjusted the market, and the building of the appreciated welfare 
state was the final outcome. 
 In contrast to this situation, Krugman said that the period since 1980 
has been characterized by divergence; the state has withdrawn from the market 
and become a regulatory state, while the market forces were given freedom to 
develop and expand, only limited by, and in interplay with judicial regulations. 
Government was replaced with governance. The period is characterized by 
high unemployment, but with inflation under control.  This control came up 
due to the monetary political strategy whose main objective was fighting 
inflation. The salaries of ordinary people in the democratic capitalist countries 
went into a race to the bottom, and the trade unions lost power and influence 
in the economic and political games. This form of governance under former 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK and former President Ronald 
Reagan in the USA is well known. 
 Since the 1980s fragmentation of government regimes has been a 
dominant development trend due to steering principles deduced from New 
Public Management theories. The representative democracy has become weak 
and fragmented and under control of international supranational governance 
structures like the EU. Therefore, citizens look upon governments not as 
representative for their own national interests, but as representatives for the 
interests of foreign states and international organizations. Out of this comes 
public poverty and confusion regarding who really governs. 
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